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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEFT AND RIGHT: 
CRITICAL JUNCTURES 
JOÃO CARDOSO ROSAS 
AND ANA RITA FERREIRA 
 
 
 
Introduction: a Short History 
 
Anthropology and the Comparative Study of Religions have revealed 
that, before becoming “political”, the left-right divide was symbolically 
charged. Perhaps because of the structure of our brain and of the fact that 
most people are right-handed rather than left-handed, in many cultural 
contexts the right acquired a positive connotation and the left a negative 
one.  
Often, the right was associated with cleanliness (the right hand 
performs clean tasks), whereas the left was related with dirtiness (the left 
hand performs dirty tasks). By the same token, the right was male, 
whereas the left was female, the right was good and the left was evil, the 
right was light, whereas the left was darkness. In short: the right was 
superior and the left inferior. 
These connotations are also present in the religions that survived the 
modern world. Thus, for instance, in Buddhism the path to Paradise is 
bifurcated, but only the right-hand side leads to Nirvana. In Christianity, 
the Son is at the right-hand side of the Father and, in the Last Supper, the 
favourite of the Lord, the apostle John, is seated at His right, not at His 
left.  
Our natural languages bear testimony to the historical and symbolic 
depth of these meanings. In English, if right means “to be right”, what 
remains is “what is left”. In French, “droite” means righteousness, whereas 
“gauche” amounts to clumsiness. In Italian, the “destra” is capable, 
whereas the “sinistra” is sinister. 
The work of J. A. Laponce (1981) was fundamental in exploring these 
and other symbolic dimensions of the dichotomy, but also showed the 
political undertones of that duality before modern times. In the Ancien 
Régime, to be at the right of the king was better than to be at his left. But 
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other dichotomies, such as high and low, or close and distant, remained 
more significant than left and right. Laponce illustrates this point with the 
description of the French Estates General of 1789, just before the left-right 
dichotomy assumed its political dominance. In the opening session of the 
Estates General: “The king and his family, located at centre stage, under a 
monumental canopy, faced the deputies. The king sat on a throne raised on 
the highest platform. At the foot of the throne stood the king’s family: to 
the king’s left, the queen and the princesses – the female side of the royal 
house, which could not inherit the kingdom; to his right, the princes – the 
group of potential successors. At the foot of the central platform, lower 
than the princes and princesses who were themselves lower than the king, 
a long bench and a table accommodated the secretaries of state. The king, 
his family and his ministers were thus clearly separated from the members 
of the three estates who stood in rows ordered from right to left. The 
clergy was on the right side, the nobility on the left. The Third Estate, 
further removed from the king’s throne than either nobles or clergy, was 
linked to the two privileged orders.” (Laponce, 1981: 47). 
Thus, until the end of the Old Regime, the up/down and the close/far 
dichotomies were still dominant. Verticality and distance were more 
significant than horizontal dispositions in the political space. Nevertheless, 
the left-right divide was already waiting in the wings, as it were, for the 
occasion to become the most relevant dichotomy in modern politics.  
The modern re-invention of the distinction between left and right 
occurred when the representatives of the Third Estate decide to transform 
the Estates General into a National Assembly with a view to giving a 
Constitution to the kingdom, and were then joined by the representatives 
of the clergy and of the aristocracy. Under this new dispensation, which 
the king ended up accepting, the seats were no longer determined by rank. 
In a spontaneous way, the Third Estate together with some aristocrats and 
the low clergy occupied the seats on the left, whereas most aristocrats and 
the high clergy sat on the right.  
It is clear that the spatial grouping in the French Assemblée Nationale 
had a practical purpose since the assembly was large and noisy and the 
deputies wanted to chat and to be close to the colleagues they identified 
with. But the fact that only a horizontal political space was available after 
the dissolution of the Estates General is very significant of this major turn 
in history. Moreover, while the decision about who should be seated on the 
left and on the right certainly reflected the deeper and historical meanings 
of left and right mentioned above,  it also acquired more substantial 
content during the discussion of the rights of man and of the future of 
constitutional rules about the legislative veto of the king.  
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According to Marcel Gauchet (1992), who offers the most probing 
analysis of the evolution of this great dichotomy in French politics, it is 
the attachment to traditional religion and the powers of the king that 
distinguished the left from the right in a self-conscious way, from as early 
as 1789 onward. Nevertheless, Gauchet – in line with Laponce – notes that 
there are not only a right and a left, but also several different sensibilities, 
both on the left and the right. These different left and right “parties” 
changed over time, and with the accidents of the Revolution. Laponce 
believes that the extremes established the dichotomy, drawing a clear 
distinction between those who loved the king and of the Old Regime, on 
the one hand, and the partisans of democratic sovereignty and the republic, 
on the other hand. Gauchet points out that left and right are the product of 
a ménage à trois, since both need a centre and it is by reference to this 
centre that left and right are defined. 
The clarification of the dichotomy and its internal distinctions occurs 
only later, during the first decades of the nineteenth century, and 
particularly within the framework of the Restoration, after 1815. Gauchet 
stresses the fact that, although the distinction had been established in 1789, 
its recurrence in popular opinion is a feature of the beginning of the 1820s. 
At this time, left and right represented the new and the old France, the 
liberals and the ultra-royalists. Many other configurations arose in the 
history of modern politics in France, but the memory of the Revolution 
and, in particular, of the Restoration, remained a strong point of reference 
for the distinction between left and right. 
It goes without saying that the dichotomy extends, after the French 
example, to virtually all constitutional regimes and democracies in Europe 
and beyond, in the 19th and 20th centuries. The distinction is everywhere in 
the realm of democratic politics. Its pervasiveness is, in itself, a challenge 
to political reflection. One can understand the background and the 
historical origins of the political distinction, but its universality and 
resilience raise more questions: Why does democratic politics require a 
left and a right? Does this dichotomy have a substantive meaning? What 
does it mean in different empirical contexts? Is the distinction between left 
and right a useful instrument for the analysis of political ideologies? 
Finally, does the divide between left and right help to understand the 
current crisis in Europe? These are some of the issues that the use of left 
and right in political language poses for philosophers, political theorists 
and empirically-oriented political scientists. We will now say a bit more 
about each one of these critical junctures. 
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1. Left, Right, and Pluralism 
Why do constitutional and democratic politics need a left and a right? 
An answer to this question probably revolves around the idea of pluralism. 
The acceptance of a pluralism of political outlooks and groups and, 
furthermore, its protection with the constitutional entrenchment of basic 
liberties, gives rise to the idea that there are several legitimate paths in 
politics, not just one. The left-right (and centre) distinction is a form of 
describing this pluralism. 
If so, the political right needs the left, and the left needs the right (and 
both need the centre). This may be difficult to accept, since the work of 
politicians consists of explaining why the right is, indeed, right and that 
the left is wrong; or, conversely, that the left is right and the right is 
wrong. Understandably, politicians and doctrinaires attempt to occupy all 
the available political space and to expel their opponents from the playing 
field. However, without the right there would be no left; and in the 
absence of the left the right would make no sense.   
We suppose this is what Steven Lukes (2003) refers to when he talks 
about “the principle of parity”. Lukes points out that the political 
vocabulary of right and left signifies a rejection of “pre-eminence or 
dominance” (Lukes, 2003: 608), and therefore an overcoming the 
symbolic and traditional superiority of the right over the left. In the modern 
“collective representations” of left and right “each has equal standing” 
(Lukes, 2003: 608). This is why many of those who reject the dichotomy 
are enemies of parity and, concomitantly, of democratic pluralism. They 
try to dis-identify with right or left and prefer to say “neither right, nor 
left” because they abhor competitive politics. It is for this reason that 
authoritarian or totalitarian politicians tend to present themselves as 
“beyond left and right”. This makes sense because they want to deny the 
relevance of pluralism, or perhaps to suppress it by force.  
Nevertheless, not everyone who uses the language of “neither left nor 
right” want to deny the principle of parity. Some are defending a centrist 
view, or some form of middle ground (a third-way, for instance). In this 
case, they may still endorse the principle of parity. Others may want to un-
identify with the left-right dichotomy because their own political camp is 
in a defensive position. Thus, for instance, in the southern-European states 
that made a transition from a right-wing authoritarian regime to 
democracy, when people say they are “neither left nor right”, this means 
they are “in the right”. By contrast, after the transition to democracy in the 
former communist countries of Eastern Europe, when someone said they 
were “neither right nor left”, this was because they were on the left. Again, 
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in these cases people may be perfectly happy to accept the principle of 
parity, but they want to disguise the fact that they belong to one of two 
main political camps.  
Although the connection between the great dichotomy and pluralist 
politics is unavoidable, it is also clear that left and right oversimplify 
“really existing” pluralism. It is often remarked – and rightly so – that 
there is not just one right but several; not just one left but many; not to 
mention a number of centres (centre-left, centre-right…). The literature on 
the subject agrees that this simplification plays an important role in 
pluralist politics. The pulverization of groups and outlooks makes it 
difficult for ordinary citizens to follow the stream of politics. The 
simplification provided by the left / right dichotomy therefore has a 
cognitive usefulness in that it reduces a plurality to a simple and more 
manageable alternative. In some cases at least, cognitive usefulness may 
come together with democratic usefulness. When the left is in power 
democratic citizens know they may turn to the right, and vice-versa. In this 
way, the dichotomy points to the existence of an alternative and helps to 
energize the political game. In other circumstances, however, the 
simplification may trivialize democratic politics, as when citizens end up 
believing that the alternation in power between left and right makes no 
significant difference. 
2. The Problem of the Substantive Meaning 
Thus far, we have highlighted the formal role of the dichotomy in 
pluralist politics, but have said nothing about the content of the distinction. 
Is “left and right” just an example of useful or convenient terminology? 
Has its meaning changed over time and space to the point of becoming 
meaningless? Or has it retained a core meaning that still applies 
universally and sheds light on the differences between those on the right 
and those on the left? 
Norberto Bobbio is probably the main contributor to this debate 
(1999). His writings on the subject appeared in the context of an Italian 
debate that included scholars such as like Cofrancesco and Galeotti, 
among many others. However, unlike the work of his opponents and 
critics, Bobbio’s contribution has become influential beyond the Italian 
context. 
Bobbio’s endeavour is analytic, not normative. He proposes to find a 
universally accepted criterion to distinguish between right and left. His 
argument is that the two sides of the dichotomy can be distinguished 
because of their different attitudes towards the value of “equality”. In a 
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nutshell, the left tends to be more egalitarian than the right, on all 
occasions and in all contexts. This does not mean that the left is radically 
egalitarian, or that the right is never egalitarian. For instance, the liberal 
right may defend equality before the law, which is a form of equality. The 
left may oppose strict economic egalitarianism – indeed, this is usually the 
case in most versions of democratic socialism or social democracy – while 
remaining, by and large, egalitarian. The analytic criterion of “equality” 
suggests that, in every possible case and context, the left tends to be more 
egalitarian, and the right less so, but the distinction is a matter of degree 
rather than absolute or essentialist. 
For Bobbio, the left is more egalitarian about the aspects to consider in 
the substantiation of equality. Take the example of access to healthcare. 
The right is more restrictive about equal access to healthcare, whereas the 
left stresses equality of access. This is why the those on the right readily 
admit that access to healthcare may depend on payments by the users of 
health services, whereas those on the left are more likely to believe that 
payment for such services introduces an unacceptable level of inequality. 
The left also tends to be more egalitarian about the number of 
individuals to include in any given “equalizing” policy. For instance, when 
broadening the franchise is at stake – to, say, women in the past, or 
immigrants in the present – the left is likely to favour a wider set of 
criteria for who gets to vote, and the right will have a more restricted view. 
The left wants to include more people in the sphere of equality (in this 
case, in reference to political rights), whereas the right is more cautious 
about the inclusion of those who are outside the existing sphere of 
equality. 
Finally, the left is still more egalitarian in the criteria it uses to defend 
equality. For example, the idea that “each should receive according to their 
need” is more egalitarian than the idea that “each should receive according 
to their merit”. Again, this does not mean that the right can never defend 
the former idea, or that the left will never uphold the latter. But it does 
mean that, when confronted with specific instantiations of these principles 
– for instance, the re-distribution of wealth – the left tends to follow the 
more and the right the less egalitarian view.  
Steven Lukes, whose interest in the subject pre-dates the Italian debate 
about the substantive content of the distinction between left and right, says 
that the left is distinguishable from the right because it defends what he 
calls “the principle of rectification” (Lukes, 2003: 612). This idea is in line 
with Bobbio’s approach, but adds the point that the left is more, as it were, 
constructivist than the right. The right accepts the facts of inequality more 
easily, whereas the left points to them in order to rectify them. The left has 
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developed social theories that unveil different aspects of inequality (in 
terms of wealth, opportunities, sex and gender, culture, age, etc.) and that 
focus on policy instruments to rectify them. By contrast, the right tends to 
criticize the excesses of the left in its project of rectification, often 
suggesting that they never produce the desired effects, and that they are 
utopian in the negative sense of the word. The dissatisfaction of the right 
with the rectification project of the left was captured by Albert Hirschman 
(1991) in his analysis of the “rhetoric of reaction”. For the right – and 
using Hirschman’s terminology – the rectification defended by the left is 
often “futile”, since it fails to produce the aims it wants to achieve. 
Moreover, the will to rectify the existing social order tends to generate 
what he calls “perverse effects” and “jeopardizes”. Instead of rectifying 
inequalities, the left very often ends up producing new inequalities, or, 
what is more, the demise of liberty. 
The Bobbio/Lukes criterion – let us call it this – is not the only 
candidate for the distinction between left and right. Laponce (1981) 
favours a distinction based on the difference between atheism and 
religiosity, for instance. But while this distinction holds in many contexts, 
it will not in many others since the right may be atheist and the left 
profoundly religious. Another suggested distinction is between 
progressivism and conservatism. It is often assumed that the left is always 
progressive and the right always conservative. But this is certainly not the 
case. The left in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall was 
conservative; and the liberal right that defended privatization and de-
regulation in the eighties and nineties was progressive when compared 
with the status quo established by the post-war social-democratic 
consensus.  
Another candidate for the distinction between left and right is the 
individualism/holism dichotomy. This point emerges in the Italian debate, 
but it was perhaps better articulated by Louis Dumont (v. Lukes, 2003), in 
the context of a debate about French national ideology. However, it is not 
the case that the left is invariably more individualistic and the right more 
holistic. Although that was the case in some contexts in France, the exact 
opposite may also happen. The left may be libertarian, but it quite often 
emphasizes the role of society, social class or social movement over the 
individual. The right is sometimes holistic, as in some forms of organic 
conservatism, but it may also be individualistic, to the point of declaring 
that “there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and 
women, and there are families” (Margaret Thatcher). 
Still another candidate to account for the distinction between left and 
right is the liberty/authority dichotomy. However, as Bobbio remarks, 
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liberty and authority are good criteria to distinguish between different lefts 
and different rights, but not between left and right. Accordingly, there are 
liberal and authoritarian lefts, but also liberal and authoritarian rights. This 
point is actually represented by the so-called bi-dimensional diagram, 
which is familiar to us because of the Political Compass test – an issue 
explored in greater detail below.  
To sum up: the Bobbio/Lukes criterion seems quite operative and it is 
widely used by political theorists, in explicit or implicit forms. This is why 
many of the authors in this volume use it extensively. However, others 
may argue that it is too speculative and that it can be accused of 
essentialism.  
3. Empirical Studies 
Beyond the realm of Political Theory, empirical studies show that 
individuals tend to place themselves, parties and politics along a left-right 
spectrum according to the “equality criterion”. In fact, all around the world 
there seems to be a recurrent association between the left, egalitarianism 
and state intervention in society. By contrast, the right is invariably 
identified with market liberalization and lesser state intervention. This 
suggests that the empirical distinction between left and right is not far 
from the Bobbio/Lukes criterion. 
First of all, it should be noted that when people are asked about their 
ideological positioning, they appear to be quite familiar with the lanaguge 
of left and right. The dichotomy clearly simplifies the complex world of 
politics (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990), and an overwhelming majority of 
individuals has no difficulty defining their position on a spectrum that 
goes from extreme-left to extreme-right, passing through centre-left and 
centre-right. Indeed, empirical studies show that citizens employ the left-
right dichotomy as the most important tool when they are thinking about 
politics, taking political positions and deciding about their vote (Knutsen, 
1998). This means that “left” and “right” are not overlapped political 
resources. On the contrary, they still make sense for today’s citizens and, 
what is more, they structure the political competition – namely the party 
competition in European countries (Huber and Inglehart, 1995). The left-
right dichotomy is still highly relevant in the empirical political world 
(Mair, 2007). 
One could say that the mere fact that people regard these antithetical 
words as extremely relevant when making political decisions does not 
mean that they really understand the dichotomy’s substantial content. The 
left-right self-placement can be an elusive idea. However, empirical 
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studies prove that citizens match their positions on the left-right spectrum 
with their level of egalitarianism and, concomitantly, their level of support 
for egalitarian policies. Individuals place themselves on some point along 
the spectrum in light of so-called socio-economic values. That is to say 
that those values play one of the most important roles in the identification 
of individuals as being either left or right – they are more relevant than 
moral values and post-materialist values in the ideological identification of 
each individual (Freire, 2006). These socio-economic values are truly 
connected with the idea of “equality”, since they call for different levels of 
social and economic equality and different ways to achieve them. So, it is 
largely one’s concept of equality that underlies one’s ideological self-
placements. 
Lipset and Rokkan (1970) undertook a historical analysis of modern 
political conflicts and presented four dichotomies that they claimed 
structured politics up until the 1970s: centre-periphery, church-state, rural-
urban and owners-workers. The latter pairing, they held, was the most 
important one to understand politics, since social class was the most 
relevant factor in individuals’ ideological positioning and consequently in 
their party affiliation and vote. The owners-workers divide counterposed 
employees (those who work to earn a salary) against employers (those 
who own the means of production), an opposition that was reflected in the 
conflict between communist and socialist parties, on the one hand, and 
liberal and conservative parties, on the other. The former parties 
constituted the “left”, since they defended social and workers’ rights and 
state intervention to guarantee wealth redistribution, public social services, 
better living conditions and a reduction of inequalities. The latter parties 
made up the “right”, because they focused on the defence of free markets, 
with as little state intervention as possible, and were reluctant to accept 
any kind of measures of social or economic equalization (Freire, 2006: 
101-102). This theory of historical cleavages – and particularly the social 
class cleavage – was the main approach to understanding ideological 
divisions, party systems and political competition in Western democracies 
until the end of 20th century, since citizens’ voting decisions were highly 
determined by their position in the social class structure. Empirical data 
showed that parties largely represented different social classes, such that 
workers were mainly leftwing and owners were mainly rightwing (Lipset 
and Rokkan, 1970). 
However, in the 1970s, some other authors, notably Ronald Inglehart 
(1977), began to argue that new cleavages were emerging, which had the 
potential to challenge and even replace traditional social cleavages. 
Inglehart’s main idea was that societies living in peace, with strong social 
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security networks and high levels of material well-being, would turn their 
attention from economic growth, safety and material security (materialist 
values) to other kinds of concerns, such as environmental protection and 
citizens’ participation in political decision-making processes (post-
materialist values). He argued that while the former cleavages had 
structured political life in the past, the latter set of concerns would become 
highly relevant in individuals’ ideological positioning in conditions of 
security, prosperity and stability (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart, 1990).  
Other authors agreed the idea of a “new politics”, but preferred to talk 
about an authoritarian-libertarian cleavage rather than a materialist-post-
materialist one (Kitschelt, 1994). This categorization suggested that 
libertarian principles – such as democratic participation, individual 
autonomy and social diversity – would shape the “new left”; and that 
authoritarian values – such as hierarchy reinforcement, limitations on 
individual autonomy and restrictions on social and cultural diversity – 
would shape the “new right”. Minorities’ rights and gender equality are 
good examples of the issues that characterize so-called “libertarian 
politics”. 
In fact, there is a close connection between libertarian and post-
materialist values. Both expressions hint at problems that are only 
powerful political issues in materially secure societies that can spare the 
energy to pay attention to other social questions. However, if it is true that 
traditional cleavages no longer determine individuals’ ideological 
positioning (Dalton, 1996), it is also the case that the new cleavages do not 
play a central role either (Gunther and Montero, 2001). Contrary to what 
Inglehart initially predicted, post-materialism (or Kitschelt’s 
libertarianism) did not win over social-economic topics in ideological self-
placement. Social and economic questions have remained the major factor 
of political competition in old and new democracies alike (Huber and 
Inglehart, 1995). The redistribution of wealth, the economic role of the 
state, and measures that aim to equalize opportunities and outcomes 
(Freire, 2006: 65) are examples of social-economic topics that keep 
dividing left and right and have a clear impact on equality, even if they are 
not connected with strict social classes anymore. 
It is true that in some European countries such as the Netherlands, 
France, Germany or Denmark, post-materialist issues are relevant for 
individuals’ ideological self-placement but they never explains more than 
10 per cent of self-positioning. At the same time, in some of these 
countries, social-economic values remain the most relevant in explaining 
ideological self-placement: they explain more than 10 per cent of 
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individuals’ positioning and, in Nordic countries like Sweden or Norway, 
almost 30 per cent (Freire, 2006, quoting European Social Survey 1999). 
Post-materialism and libertarianism “have entered in the political 
agenda and created new bases of partisan conflict” (Dalton, 1996: 320). 
However, these new issues not only did not take social-economic priority, 
as they have also been absorbed by the left-right dichotomy (Freire, 2006: 
119), since citizens on the left simultaneously show concern with social 
and economic topics as well as post-materialist-libertarian values (and the 
opposite happens on the right). In fact, questions raised by post-
materialism and libertarianism can be easily set out in terms of more (or 
less) equality – even if they do not refer to traditional economic equality, 
but to new spheres of equality. For that reason, it is understandable that the 
(egalitarian) left has become sympathetic to those values and adopted 
some of them – while the (inegalitarian) right has maintained materialist 
and authoritarian positions.  
Empirical studies prove that individuals who place themselves on the 
left are more likely to adhere to new rights for all citizens in order to 
ensure that all participate in political decision-making (rather than having 
political life overwhelmingly in the hands of a small elite), to extend rights 
to minority groups, reinforce women’s as well as environmental and 
quality of life rights, all of which means more equality among individuals. 
On the other end of the political spectrum, individuals tend to oppose 
“new politics’ demands” and focus on more materialist and authoritarian 
concerns – thus preventing a broadening of equality (Freire, 2006: 119-
121). There is a match between the old dichotomy and (what has been 
thought of as being) the new one. 
However, social-economic values have a stronger explanatory role than 
moral and post-materialist values in determining ideology. And, as 
expected, individuals who place themselves on the right defend a minimal 
role for the state in economic and social life and are less supportive of 
equalization through the Welfare State and redistribution. Individuals that 
consider themselves leftwing have the opposite attitude, defending state 
intervention in the economy, redistribution and the Welfare State as 
important means to combat inequality (Freire, 2006: 112-114). Although 
social class has ceased to be the major explanatory factor for ideological 
self-positioning, the old political topics are still relevant and still divide 
left from right. Grosso modo, there are more “right-wing workers” and 
“left-wing owners” today (an idea that would have seeemd rather absurd in 
the 1960s), but what determines the choice is still people’s attitude to 
equality among individuals.  
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It should be noted, however, that while social class is declining as a 
factor of ideological placement, “social identity” is becoming more 
relevant – and the latter depends on several aspects of social identification, 
associated with specific life styles, which may not be linked to people’s 
social origins. However, even this social identity (which includes trusting 
big companies or trade unions, or the frequency of religious practice) 
remains weak when it comes to explaining individuals’ positioning on a 
left-right spectrum (Freire, 2006), having yet to attain the explanatory 
power of  social class.  
Aside from values, there are other factors that contribute to the 
alignment of citizens on the left or the right. In most countries, party 
identification matters more than values. In fact, party dimension usually 
explains more than 25 per cent of ideological self-placement – and 
sometimes even more than 50 per cent (Freire, 2006). Nevertheless, since 
most political parties tend to identify with a specific chart of values and a 
particular ideology, this again suggests the relevance of the substantive 
content – and not just the form – of the dichotomy. 
In short: empirical studies prove that the left-right dichotomy is still 
operative and makes sense in today’s politics. Further, they show that the 
dichotomy has retained its essential meaning, regardless of historical 
variables, and that no other pair of antithetical terms has replaced it, since 
none of the potential competitors sum up or clarify political life as 
comprehensively. 
4. Left, Right, and Ideologies 
Two aspects we have not dealt with directly thus far is the connection 
between left and right, on the one hand, and the language of political 
ideologies, on the other. The dichotomy “left and right” is part of ordinary 
usage in political language, but so is the vocabulary of ideology: socialist, 
liberal and conservative, among others. Is the left-right divide a useful 
instrument for the analysis of these and other ideologies? 
The simplest way of answering this question consists in placing 
ideological outlooks along a line representing the spectrum from left to 
right: 
 
left _______________________ right 
 
However, there are several ways to organize this kind of 
representation, because the place occupied by ideologies has changed over 
time since the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century (and 
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as a result of changing societal contexts as well, of course). Very roughly, 
one may distinguish four different “ideological moments” in the history of 
Europe: 
 
1) The first corresponds to the first decades the nineteenth century. In 
this context, liberals occupied the left end of the spectrum. They favoured 
reform, democracy, republicanism, anti-clericalism, the free market and a 
weaker state. Why should they be placed on the left? Because they were 
egalitarian given their opposition to the hierarchies inherited from the Old 
Regime that were based on blood and status (although they were not 
egalitarian as far as as private property was concerned). Conservaties took 
the right position. They were the party of order, tradition, monarchy, 
established religion, and favoured a stronger state. They occupied the 
right-wing end of the political spectrum because they were strongly anti-
egalitarian, favouring inherited social hierarchies, even if they may have 
admitted the principle of “noblesse oblige”. Accordingly, the graphic 
representation for this period is as follows: 
 
left _________________________________________ right 
          liberalism                     conservatism 
 
2) The second moment corresponds to a later period in the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth, when socialist ideas and 
movements became increasingly important across Europe. In this context, 
socialists occupied the left end of the spectrum because they were more 
egalitarian than the liberals. Not only did they oppose inherited 
hierarchies, but they also favoured economic equality and opposed private 
property. By occupying the left-hand end of the spectrum, they pushed the 
liberals to the centre: 
 
left _________________________________________ right 
      socialism             liberalism              conservatism 
 
Interestingly, this re-composition never occurred in the United States, 
because socialist ideas and movements failed to gain popular support 
there. According to Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks (2000), 
among others, socialism failed in the US because of deeply embedded 
historical and cultural factors (such as individualism). Whatever the 
reasons, the fact is that in the US liberals remained on the left and the 
conservatives on the right as in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. This is not to say that U.S. liberals today think like European 
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liberals did in the nineteenth century. The breaking point for American 
Liberalism was the New Deal. Since then, American liberals began to 
support a bigger state, whereas American conservatives, who first 
favoured a strong state, shifted to support a small state and laissez-faire 
economics. U.S. liberals should not be confused with European social 
democrats, although this is what U.S. conservatives think of them (hence 
their accusation that President Obama is a “socialist”). 
 
3) The third moment in Europe waas the era of extremisms in the 
twentieth century. This period was particularly challenging for the left-
right dichotomy as an instrument for the analysis of ideologies. Thus far, 
we have suggested that democratic ideologies may be placed along a left-
right continuum. Another question is whether or not non-democratic or 
extra-constitutional ideologies can also be classified according to the left-
right dichotomy. In Political Man (1960) and after, Lipset argued that the 
same yardstick should be used to analyse extremist parties and ideologies 
and their democratic counterparts, defining them as left, right or centre 
parties or ideologies. On the face of it, this would lead to the graphic 
representation below: 
 
left _________________________________________ right 
       Communism                         fascism 
 
However, this is not the representation that Lipset’s observations 
suggest.  He defends the counterintuitive thesis that classic fascism, or 
Nazi fascism, was not extremism of the right but rather of the centre. In 
purely ideological terms, fascism was similar to the democratic centre (or 
liberalism) in its opposition to big business, trade unions and the socialist 
state, as well as in its distaste for religion and traditionalism (although 
unlike liberalism, it also favoured a strong state). Moreover, the social 
bases of fascism are identical to those of liberalism: the middle-classes, 
small businessmen, white-collar workers and anticlerical professionals. 
Lipset argued that the rightwing extreme was occupied by authoritarian 
conservatives such as Salazar in Portugal and Franco in Spain; and that the 
extreme left was occupied not only by Communists but also by other 
egalitarian populisms such as Peronism in Argentina and other comparable 
movements in underdeveloped countries. Thus, a representation following 
Lipset would be as follows: 
 
left ________________________________________________ right 
Communism, Peronism, etc. / Nazi-fascism / Salazarism, Franquism, etc. 
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Another way of representing the extremes departs from the traditional 
scheme and introduces a vertical axis, cutting across the left-right 
horizontal axis. This is the above-mentioned bi-dimensional representation 
that was popularized through the Political Compass tests. The second axis 
was first introduced by Hans Eysenk (1954), a political psychologist, to 
distinguish between democratic or liberty-inclined views, and authoritarian 
or authority inclined views. On this basis, one can place both democratic 
and non-democratic ideological outlooks in the same diagram, as follows:  
 
          authority 
 
                 communism                   (fascism?)                 authoritarian  
             conservatism 
  left ________________________________________________ right 
                 democratic socialism      liberalism               non-authoritarian  
           conservatism 
 
           liberty 
 
There are reasons to be sceptical about the application of the left-right 
divide to extremist ideologies as suggested by Lipset and others. As shown 
in section 1 above, the dichotomy makes sense in a pluralist regime and it 
emerged with modern constitutionalism. A political continuum of 
extremisms is a counterfactual exercise of the imagination. In fact, there is 
no parliament of extremisms, no feasible coexistence between different 
extremist ideologies in the same political order. So the representation of 
extremisms as being on the left, right or centre is an attempt to find family 
resemblances between these ideologies and their democratic counterparts, 
but it does not tell us about the role of extremisms in politics.  
Nonetheless, extremist ideologies arose in the framework of 
constitutional democracies and political pluralism and so they can be 
classified in accordance to their origins, even if they ended up denying the 
pluralist context from which they originated. 
 
4) The fourth moment in the history of Europe covers the last two or 
three decades, in which both socialism and conservatism seem to have 
learned some lessons from liberalism. Although they maintain their 
respective positions on the spectrum, both conservatism and socialism 
seem to have incorporated liberal views. For instance traditional 
conservatism used to be suspicious of the radical forms of market 
liberalism, but this has not been the case at least since the 1980s and 1990s 
and the liberal-conservative synthesis initiated in the United Kingdom. 
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Socialism used to be equally distant from economic liberalism, but this 
ceased to be the case after the emergence of the Third Way, or Die Neue 
Mitte, or similar shifts. If one excludes both the far-left and the far-right, in 
their democratic avatars, the representation of mainstream ideologies in 
the last decades of the twentieth century and of the beginning of the 
twenty-first might look like this: 
 
left _________________________________________ right 
liberal-socialism          liberal-conservatism 
 
Finally, does the analysis of ideologies from the point of view of left 
and right really help us to understand at least democratic ideologies? If one 
is to judge by the recurrent use of this frame of analysis in the literature, 
the answer must be yes. But there are sceptics too, particularly among 
those who study ideologies according to the framework developed by 
Michael Freeden, so-called “morphologic analysis” (Freeden, 1996). 
According to Freeden and others, it makes little sense to represent 
ideologies along the left-right spectrum. The macro-ideologies – socialism, 
liberalism and conservatism – are deep and complex structures that 
interweave a number of concepts that have remained relatively stable over 
time despite contextual variations and interconnections. Macro and micro 
ideologies are not mutually exclusive and they do not always establish 
clear-cut alternatives for political action. Thus, the argument goes, 
ideologies do not exist in a continuum, as suggested by the application of 
the left-right dichotomy. There is no gradual ordering of ideologies, from 
left to right, or from more to less egalitarian. 
Indeed, as Freeden argues, the classification of ideologies along the left-
right continuum is in itself an ideological enterprise. It conveys the false idea 
that there is a fixed marketplace of political ideas, a set number of centrist, 
radical and extremist views that can be perceived easily and consciously by 
all. However, this is a simplification of what ideologies are about. Moreover, 
this simplification is induced by a behaviourist approach to politics, which 
focuses on concrete and well-defined forms of human conduct. 
It should be noted that some of those who deny the relevance of the 
great dichotomy also deny the relevance of ideologies (although Freeden is 
not one of them). Typically, this happens when one of the sides of the 
ideological and political struggle is seen to have prevailed over the other. 
The idea of the “end of ideologies” was defended by Eduard Shills (1955) 
and Daniel Bell (1962) among others in the 1950s and 1960s, supposedly 
resulting from the defeat of fascism and the demise of Stalinism, and the 
future convergence of both sides of the Cold War in societies oriented to 
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the satisfaction of consumers. At the end of the 1980s, Francis Fukuyama 
(1992) argued the even bolder case for “the end of history”, after the fall 
of the communist world in Eastern Europe, based on the belief that a 
single model of market liberalism and liberal democracy had definitively 
won the political battle. 
The interesting point about theses that defend the end of ideology or 
history and deny the relevance of the left-right divide or of other political 
cleavages is that they have invariably been followed by powerful divisions 
and political struggles in the 1960s and in the first decade of the twenty 
first century, arguably pitting a left against a right and different ideological 
outlooks: the new social movements versus traditional society in the 
1960s; and the opposition to financial globalization and deregulation 
versus the defence of free and open markets today. 
So, it seems idle to deny the ongoing relevance of the left-right 
dichotomy even in the analysis of ideologies, although one should 
acknowledge that it does not always shed light on the diversity and 
complexity of the ideological world we inhabit (or that inhabits our 
minds). The left-right dichotomy, as stressed from the outset, is a 
simplification – perhaps even the greatest possible simplification – of the 
political alternatives available over time. It does say something about 
politics, but not everything that can be said about politics.  
Final Remarks: Revisiting the Dichotomy in a Time 
of Crisis 
This brings us to the critical juncture we face today regarding the 
theoretical and empirical relevance of the great dichotomy in the context 
of the crisis that began in 2007 or 2008 and is still unfolding, with 
particularly harsh consequences in Europe and in its periphery. 
There are two competing narratives about what is happening, one 
clearly emanating from the left, another from the right. The first says that 
the crisis originated in the triumph of neo-liberalism in the 1980s and after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the politics of privatization and de-
regulation. The competing narrative sees the causes of the crisis in the 
intervention of the state in the United States housing market and thereafter 
with overspending by many states to avoid a deeper crisis.  
There are also left and right solutions to the crisis, of course. The right 
believes that the solution lies in austerity for countries that face a debt 
crisis, whereas the left criticizes excessive austerity as counterproductive 
and advocates a more gradual adjustment. The left wants the state and the 
central banks – and the EU – to act in order to promote growth. The right 
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emphasizes that growth can only come from sound public finances and 
market creativity. 
Finally, there are expectations on the left and right regarding the 
aftermath of the crisis. The left believes that this historical moment is 
forcing us to re-clarify the divide along traditional lines. The issues at 
stake are social and economic, not cultural or symbolic as they were a few 
years ago. Thus, Europe and other parts of the world should return to the 
core values of equality and solidarity and defend the welfare state. For its 
part, the right believes that the left’s belief in a better future for the 
working classes is condemned to fail because of the limitations of 
economic growth and demographic change. Societies must become more 
efficient and sustainable, which is incompatible with the kind of welfare 
state and generous redistribution policies defended by the left. 
Whether one thinks about the causes of the crisis, the solutions to the 
problems it has caused or about the expectations of its aftermath, one is 
unavoidably confronted with the great political dichotomy that has 
accompanied pluralist political regimes since they were institutionalized in 
the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. Must we think, 
once again, with and within that dichotomy, or can we think better outside it? 
The contributions to this volume provide answers to these and other questions 
in ways that are both theoretically sound and empirically informed. 
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THE GREAT DICHOTOMY THEORIZED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In this section of this volume, several authors address the issue of the 
usefulness of the great dichotomy, and discuss its content. All of them tend 
to stress that the left-right distinction is, in practical terms, still useful. 
Moreover, they start from the classical definition proposed by Noberto 
Bobbio, who sees the content of the distinction in the different attitudes of 
left and right towards “equality” (the left being more egalitarian, the right 
less so). Nevertheless, they also disagree with Bobbio insofar as they 
propose revisions and/or amendments to his way of distinguishing the left 
from the right. 
In his discussion of Bobbio’s work, Giglioli confronts the disjunction 
between the persistent practical valence of the dichotomy and the 
perception by the citizenry of the erosion of its content centred around the 
idea of “equality”. Giglioli tends to see this problem as a result of the 
crisis of democracy. Globalization explains why the dichotomy has 
become an empty alternative for the demos at the national level. 
Democratic life takes place at the national level but most relevant 
decisions have been displaced to the global or European (in the case of the 
EU) levels. This transformation of politics need not lead to the demise of 
the left-right dichotomy, Giglioli contends, but it shows that it can only be 
recovered beyond the level of the nation-state.  
Peter Caws also believes that some political issues today should not be 
aligned along the left-right continuum (the tension between Islam and the 
West is a case in point). Nevertheless, he suggests that some of the 
dimensions of the dichotomy, and not just the political ones, remain 
pervasive in society. Thus, aside from the “political axis” dealing with 
equality that is connected with ideas of liberty and community, several 
other axes are still relevant: philosophical, moral, religious and economic, 
among others. As Caws argues, these axes generate specific polarities, 
which may be represented by the left-right dichotomy.  
Cristina Montalvão Sarmento, Patrícia Oliveira and Joana Ferreira use 
a metaphorical and allusive style in their personal reflections on the great 
dichotomy. Starting with the idea that being leftwing or rightwing is a 
fundamental matter for “political man”, they point to the difficulties of 
defining the specific values of the two sides of the political divide, and 
